Linear logic has been used to specify the operational semantics of various process calculi. In this paper we explore how meta-level judgments, such as simulation and bisimulation, can be established using such encodings. In general, linear logic is too weak to derive such judgments and we focus on extensions of linear and intuitionistic logics using de nitions. We explore these extensions in the context of transition systems.
Introduction
While the notions of de nition and theory are similar in that they both provide formulas useful for constructing a proof, the notion of de nition carries the added intension that there are no other ways that de ned concepts can be established. Such a notion of de nition has been investigated in proof systems in recent years: Halln as considered similar notions in the context of \partial inductive de nitions" 13]; Halln as and Schroeder-Heister considered classical and intuitionistic logic with proof rules incorporating de nitions 14, 23] , and in the note 12], Girard independently developed a similar use of de nitions for linear logic. Most recently, McDowell and Miller have incorporated de nitions into an intuitionistic proof system that also included natural number induction 18] . In all of these cases, it can be shown that if certain restrictions are placed on the structure of de nitions, de ned concepts have left and right introduction rules that enjoy a cut-elimination theorem. Some examples of using such a de nition mechanism have been given for equality reasoning 12, 23] , forms of program completion in logic programming 14, 24] , the GCLA language project 3], and for meta-level reasoning about logical inference 19] .
Cut-free sequent calculus proofs have been successfully used to encode the operational semantics of a wide range of computational systems. For example, the evaluation of functional programming languages and of their abstract machines have been speci ed in intuitionistic logic 4, 16, 15] ; imperative and concurrency features have been modeled using linear logic programming languages 5, 6, 9, 20, 21] ; and the sequential and concurrent (pipe-line) semantics of a RISC processor have also been speci ed in linear logic 6]. It is natural, therefore, to ask what such a de nition facility adds to speci cations written in these logics. In this paper, we show that if the speci cation of a transition system is made into a de nition (instead of just a theory), then it is possible to go beyond operational semantics and also prove judgments such as simulation and bisimulation.
2 Proof theory preliminaries A de nition is a countable set of clauses, and clauses are expressions of the form 8 x p( t) 4 = B], where the free variables of B are free in some term of the list of terms t, and all variables free in some t are contained in the list of variables x. The formula B is the body and p( t) is the head of that clause. We do not assume that distinct clauses have distinct predicates p in their head: de nitions act to de ne predicates by mutual recursion. The symbol 4 = is not a logical connective: it is used just to denote de nition clauses.
We shall assume that the reader is familiar with the usual two-sided sequent calculus presentation of intuitionistic logic 10] and linear logic 11] . Left and right introduction rules for atomic formulas will now be given based on a xed de nition. The right rule is given as Here, A is atomic and is a set or multiset of formulas (depending on whether we are using linear or intuitionistic logic). If we think of a de nition as a logic program, then this rule is essentially the same as backchaining. We use Eriksson Specifying a set of sequents as the premise in the left introduction rule should be understood to mean that each sequent in the set is a premise of the rule. Notice that the set of premises could be in nite since de nitions might be in nite and since complete sets of uni ers can be in nite, as is the case when the term language is, for example, simply typed -terms 17]. In this paper, however, terms will be rst-order and the complete set of uni ers will either be empty, if the terms are not uni able, or a singleton set containing the most general uni er. Notice the di erent \quanti cational" interpretation of these two rules when reading them bottom-up: def R replaces A with the body of some clause in the de nition whose head matches with A, while def L replaces A with the body of all the clauses whose heads unify with A. These di erent quanti cational aspects play an important role in our uses of de nitions.
If D is a de nition, we write D` ?! C to mean that ?! C is provable in the underlying logic (intuitionistic or linear) possibly using the right introduction rule for de nitions, and we write D` ?! C to mean that ?! C is provable using possibly the left and right introduction rules for de nitions. The rst notion can be reduced to provability in both intuitionistic and linear logics directly by incorporating the de nition into the antecedent of the sequent (using reverse implication in place of Admitting de nitions in this fashion does not always yield a proof system from which cut can be eliminated: to achieve a cut-elimination result, various restrictions on de nitions are needed. We are only interested here in proof systems from which cut can be eliminated, and we describe these restrictions in later sections as we need them. To illustrate our results, we will consider through the paper a more concrete example of an abstract transition system: the concurrent language CCS 22] . For convenience, we ignore the renaming andhiding combinators, and concentrate on the sublanguage described by the grammar p ::= 0 j a:p j p + p j p j p j x p; where a ranges over an arbitrary set of actions A, the set of the complementary actions A, and f g.
The intended meaning of these symbols is as follows: 0 represents the inactive process, a:p represents a process pre xed by the action a, + and j are choice and parallel composition, respectively, and x is the least xed point operator, providing recursion. The operational semantics of CCS is speci ed by the transition rules in Figure 1 .
CCS can be seen as an abstract transition system where = A A f g, S is the set of all expressions denoting CCS expressions, and is the set of transitions which are derivable by the rules above. A nite CCS process is a CCS process that does not contain . If S is restricted to the set of all nite CCS processes, then the resulting ats is noetherian. into the set P, we have a premise set for (p; q) and we have established an instance of the SIM 1 rule. Since all these proof steps are forced, this proves the completeness of SIM 1 . The correctness follows immediately by reversing these reasoning steps.
Notice that for a noetherian ats we do not need instances of the initial sequent rule: a proof of p ?! p can be obtained using only the SIM 1 rule or the corresponding combination of def L, def R, 9L, 9R, L, R, ? L, and ? R. This observation is similar to the one that holds of most proof systems: the initial rule is needed to prove A ?! A only when A is atomic; that is, when A has a non-logical symbol as its head symbol. When using ats 1 ( ), in a sense, states become logical constants, and hence we do not need any instance of the initial rule.
We can now establish our rst proof theoretic connection to simulation. 
Encoding one-step transitions as atomic judgments
While using linear logic directly to encode transitions was rather natural and immediate, the resulting encoding will not be able to provide us information about bisimilarity in many situations, as is illustrated in Example 4. To overcome this problem we give a second encoding of abstract transition systems, this time encoding the relations between states as predicates rather than logical connectives. We will not need linearity restrictions, so we will use an intuitionistic logic for this encoding. Again, de nitions will play a role rather similar to the one it played with the previous encoding.
Consider intuitionistic logic using the connectives true for true,^for conjunction, for implication, and 8 and 9 for universal and existential quanti cation. The encoding ats 2 ( ) is based on an extensional description of , hence the program will be in nite if is in nite. In speci c transition systems the transition relation might be described intentionally. This is the case for CCS, whose transitions can be encoded as the following de nition ccs(A) for any non-empty set A of actions:
8A; P one(A:P; A; P) Observe that we are using meta-level -abstraction to encode x P: such a term is represented as M, where M is meant to be the abstraction x:P. Thus the term P x P=x] can be represented simply by M( M) without introducing an explicit notion of substitution ( -conversion in the meta-logic can perform substitution for us).
The following result shows that CCS transitions are completely described by logical derivability in ccs(A). This theorem can be proved by simple structural induction by showing that proofs using the inference rules in Figure 1 for CCS are essentially identical to sequent calculus proofs over the corresponding clauses in the de nition ccs(A). Notice that the sequent calculus proofs involve only right introduction rules.
If we explicitly represent the transition step by a predicate one (de ned by ats 2 ( ) or by a system like ccs(A)), then it is possible to characterize simulation and bisimulation as predicates sim and bisim given by the following de nition, named sims. Since the level of one is 0, we need to assign to both sim and bisim the level 1 (or higher where P is a premise set for (p; q) and Q is a premise set for (q; p).
Again, these rules are nitary if the ats is nitely branching. In the case of CCS, one condition which guarantees this property is that recursion variables in bodies of -terms only occur pre xed.
Let SIM 2` ?! C (respectively, BISIM 2` ?! C) denote the proposition that the sequent ?! C can be proved using only the SIM 2 (respectively, BISIM 2 ) inference rule.
The following lemma is the analogue of Lemma 2 for this second encoding. Lemma Concerning CCS, the full language is not noetherian because of the presence of the recursion operator. If we consider only terms without , i.e. nite processes, then the same property holds, as is witnessed by the following Theorem. We omit the proof of this theorem since it is essentially like the preceding proof: the main di erence is that the de nition of one-step transitions in CCS is given by recursion. 6 Non-nite behavior cases As we mentioned in Section 2, de nitions can be seen as a mutually recursive de nition for the predicates that are present in the heads of clauses. To make the notion of recursive de nition more explicit, we consider in more detail the de nitions used in the previous section. For a general discussion of using strati ed speci cations to provide for mutually recursive predicate de nitions, see, for example, 2].
The clauses for de ning the level 0 predicate one (both for abstract transition systems and for CCS) can be seen as simple Horn clauses (when 4 = is read as a reverse implication). The usual means for providing meaning to Horn clauses by seeing them as a monotone mapping on the Herbrand universe can be exploited here as well 1]. In particular, we can observe that if we remove the one clause of the CCS de nition pertaining to (that is, if we do not allow processes to contain occurrences of the xed point operator) then the resulting de nition for one would yield an operator on the Herbrand universe with exactly one xed point. We shall take this xed point as the meaning of the de nition for one.
Simulation and bisimulation are predicates of level 1 using recursive de nitional clauses of the form 8P8Q r(P; Q) 4 = ], where the formula contains free occurrences of the variables P; Q, strictly positive occurrences of the predicate r, and both positive and negative occurrences of the predicate one. With such a clause we associate a function from binary relations to binary relations. Given the structure of it is easy to see that will be monotone and thus have xed points: in general, however, there will be more than one such xed point.
Notice that both def L and def R are sound for all the relations which are xed points of . To see this, assume that for any relation r there is only one such de nitional clause (in case there are more, we group them in one clause which has as body the disjunction of the bodies). Then observe that the use of def L corresponds to replacing 4 = by in the clause, that is, to assuming the formula 8P8Q r(P; Q) ]. The case for def R corresponds to the converse: that is, of replacing 4 = with .
Let s and b be the bodies of the clauses given in sims for sim and bisim, respectively, and consider the corresponding functions s and b on binary relations associated with these formulas. More explicitly, we may de ne these two functions on binary relations as follows: Since def L and def R are sound in all xed points, if ats 2 ( ); sims`sim(p; q) holds then (p; q) must be contained in every xed point of s . In a noetherian abstract transition system, s and b have unique xed points, and it is for this reason that v and can be completely characterized in a noetherian ats by provability (Theorem 9). One attempt to characterize the greatest xed point of the relation transformer prooftheoretically is to introduce a notion of \proof with nite or in nite height". An !-proof of the sequent ?! C with inference rules taken from the set L is a tree whose root is labeled by ?! C, and such that for every node N there is an instance of an inference rule of L whose conclusion is the label of N, and whose premises are the labels of the children of N. We will denote by L`! ?! C the existence of an !-proof in L for ?! C. For example, SIM 2`! ?! C is true if ?! C has an !-proof using only SIM 2 . If the set L of inference rules is determined by those in intuitionistic logic and those arising from using some de nition, say D, then we write D`! ?! C. Notice that an !-proof can have nite or in nite height, and that this is orthogonal to the proof being nitely or in nitely branching, which is related to the possibility of having in nitary rules.
We prove now that Lemma 8 still holds for !-proofs. Proof We outline the proof of the rst case; the second can be done similarly. Since the converse is immediate, we only show the forward direction. Assume that the sequent ?! sim(p; q) has an !-proof using the de nition ats 2 ( ). Since this sequent must be proved by one use of def R, two uses of 8R, and one use of R, we have where A and P 0 are variables. At this point, the proof can proceed by either def L or 9R. If the choice is def L, then we quickly get that the proof is essentially an instance of SIM 2 at the root, and we proceed recursively through the !-proof. Otherwise, a use of 9R would give raise to a conjunction, the rst component of which is one(q; A; q 0 ) for some particular q 0 2 S. It is not possible, however, to prove this atom using def R since no instance of a clause in the de nition ats 1 ( ) has the variable A in its head. Thus, this proof could not be built in that fashion.
We can now extend Theorem 9 to !-proofs, and drop the noetherian condition. Proof We prove only the rst equivalence since the second follows similarly. First, assume that ats 2 ( ); sims`! sim(p; q): By Lemma 12, SIM 2`! sim(p; q). Let be a proof of ?! sim(p; q) that contains just the SIM 2 inference rule and let R be the binary relation such that rRs if r ?! s has an occurrence in . It is easy to see that R is a simulation containing (p; q). Assume next that p v q holds. We construct a monotonic sequence of trees fT k g k2! such that for every k, the root of T k is labeled by ?! sim(p; q), all the leaves of T k are labeled by sequents of the form ?! sim(p 0 ; q 0 ) where p 0 v q 0 holds, and T k+1 is obtained from T k by attaching to each leaf of T k an appropriate instance of SIM 2 . T 0 is the tree consisting solely of the node labeled ?! sim(p; q). Given For Lemma 12 and Theorem 13 to hold, it is important that the relation one be de ned in a \noetherian" way itself. If we consider a recursive de nition for one, like in ccs(A) (with the clause for ), then the reverse direction of these equivalences does not necessarily hold, as the following example illustrates. Example 14 The CCS terms x x and x a:x are such that neither SIM 2`! sim( x a:x; x x) nor x a:x v x x hold. However, the judgment ccs(A); sims`! sim( x a:x; x x) holds.
Thus, notice that x x a ?! x a:x does not hold, while ccs(A)`! one( x x; a; x a:x). The in nite proof of one( x x; a; x a:x) is in a sense an \in nite failure". If we restrict to nite CCS processes, then such in nite failures do not occur with respect to the one step transition steps and the only in nite proof behaviors will be those that positively verify the greatest xed point properties of simulation and bisimulation. Thus, when restricted to nite CCS processes, the generalization of Theorem 13 where ats 2 ( ) is replaced with ccs(A) holds.
An inductive encoding of simulation and bisimulation
In previous sections we have shown how to encode in sequent calculus various relations over the states of a transition system. We now explore the kinds of properties on the relations that can be proved within the calculus or via some characterization provided by the calculus.
Example 15 The property \bisimulation is preserved by the pre x operator" holds in CCS. The corresponding encoding of this property is also provable in the sequent calculus; that is, we have ccs(A); sims`8A8P8Q bisim(P; Q) bisim(A:P; A:Q)]; a proof of which is easy to construct. The property \bisimulation is symmetric" holds in any transition system. The corresponding encoding of this property is also provable in the sequent calculus; that is, we have ats 2 ( ); sims`8P8Q bisim(P; Q) bisim(Q; P)]; which is also easy to verify.
However, as the following examples illustrate, there are plenty of true properties of and v that cannot be proved within the logic. One reason for this lack is, intuitively, we can prove properties of sim and bisim only if they are true for every xed point of s and b , but in the non-noetherian case, there is in general more than one xed point.
Example 16 The property \bisimulation equivalence implies the largest simulation" (or more formally: is a subset of v) is true in any transition system. This property can be expressed by the formula 8P8Q bisim(P; Q) sim(P; Q)] but, in general, if is a non-noetherian transition relation, this formula cannot be proved using the de nitions ats 2 ( ) and sims. For example, if we take the transition system (fag; fpg; f(p; a; p)g) it is immediate to see that f(p; p)g is a bisimulation (the greatest xed point of b , namely bisimulation equivalence) and ; is a simulation (the least xed point of s ). Hence, this formula cannot be proved for this transition system. Example 17 The property \bisimulation equivalence is re exive" holds in any transition system. The formula 8P bisim(P; P)] cannot be proved using the de nitions ats 2 ( ) and sims. Consider for instance the same transition system as in Example 16: the empty set ; is a bisimulation (the least xed point of b ), and it is, of course, not re exive.
Example 18 The property \bisimulation equivalence is preserved by the + operator" is true in CCS. This property can be expressed as the formula 8P8Q8R bisim(P; Q) bisim(P +R; Q+R))].
This sequent cannot be proved using ccs(A) and sims. In fact, take P = a:0, Q = a:0 + a:0 and R = x a:x. The least xed point of b contains the pair (a:0; a:0 + a:0) but not the pair (a:0 + x a:x; a:0 + a:0 + x a:x).
The notion of \in nite proof", introduced in the previous section, can be helpful to prove properties on the de ned relations at the meta (mathematical) level. For instance, the properties in Examples 16 and 17 can both be proved by using the characterization of and v provided at the end of the previous section. It is easy to see, in fact, that ccs(A); sims`! bisim(P; P). Concerning the implication bisim(P; Q) sim(P; Q), observe that any in nite proof for ?! bisim(P; Q) contains an in nite proof of ?! sim(P; Q).
The characterization of simulation or bisimulation using !-proofs is not so helpful because the existence of an in nite proof for a given sequent is co-semidecidable but (in general) not semidecidable. A better approach would be to use induction to capture the greatest xed point. branching is guaranteed whenever all the recursion variables in -expressions are pre xed.) Thus, one approach to showing that two states are bisimilar is to show that for all natural numbers i, those two states are related by i . Such statements can often be proved by induction on natural numbers. We can incorporate induction into our proof systems by introducing natural numbers using z for zero and s for successor and using the predicate nat and the following \introduction" rules for this new predicate.
?
Here, x, P, and Q are schematic variables of these inference rule, and y is a variable not free in Q. The rst two rules can be seen as right introduction rules for nat while the third rule, encoding induction over natural numbers, can be seen as a left introduction rule. In the left introduction rule, Q ranges over formulas with one variable extracted (say, using -abstraction) and represents the property that is proved by induction: the third premise of that inference rule witnesses the fact that, in general, Q will express a property stronger than P. The paper 18] contains a proof that cut-elimination holds for intuitionistic logic extended with both these rules for natural numbers and with strati ed de nitions. Notice that with this formulation of induction, cut-free proofs will not have the subformula property. We use`I N to denote provability using both left and right introduction rules for de nitions as well as the above mentioned left and right rules for natural numbers. If n is a natural number, then we write n to denote the corresponding \numeral" for n, that is, n is the term containing n occurrences of s and one occurrence of z.
We can now encode v i and i by using the indexed versions of sim and bisim found in the de nition ssimsshown in Figure 2 .
Proposition 19 Let ( ; S; ) be an ats, and let p and q be members of S. If ats 2 ( ); ssims`I N sim(p; q) then for every natural number n, ats 2 ( ); ssims`ssim( n; p; q). If ats 2 ( ); ssims`I N bisim(p; q) then for every natural number n, ats 2 ( ); ssims`sbisim( n; p; q).
Proof We prove the rst result about simulation: the result about bisimulation is similar. A cut-free proof of the sequent ?! sim(p; q) must end in a def R rule, which (using 8R and R also) means that the sequent nat(k) ?! ssim(k; p; q) is provable, where k is a variable. Call this proof . Now let n be a natural number. It is possible to substitute n for the variable k into the proof to obtain the proof n=k] of the sequent nat( n) ?! ssim( n; p; q). (Such substitution into proofs is not completely trivial: for example, when substituting into an occurrence of def L, some premises many no longer appear in the resulting proof. For details, see 18].) Given that n is a natural number, it is easy to construct a cut-free proof of ?! nat( n), one using only the right rules for nat. Now placing these two proofs together with a cut rule yields ?! nat( n) nat( n) ?! ssim( n; p; q) ?! ssim( n; p; q) Given the cut-elimination result for this logic involving de nitions and induction 18], we can conclude that ?! ssim( n; p; q) has a cut-free proof (a conclusion that is needed in the proof of Proposition 20 below). Since the predicate nat does not appear in the de nition of ssim or in any de nitional clause on which it relies, the resulting proof does not contain any occurrences of induction.
Proposition 20 Let ( ; S; ) be an ats, p and q be members of S, and n be a natural number. If ats 2 ( ); ssims`ssim( n; p; q) then p v n q. If ats 2 ( ); ssims`sbisim( n; p; q) then p n q.
Proof We prove the rst result about simulation: the result about bisimulation is similar. Assume that n is 0. Then p v 0 q holds immediately. Otherwise, let n be m + 1. Assume that ats 2 ( ); ssims`ssim(s( m); p; q) has a cut-free proof. An analysis of the inference rules used to prove this sequent (as we argued similarly in Section 5) shows that that for some premise set P, In this full proof system, it is possible to prove, for instance, re exivity of bisimulation equivalence, and bisimilarity of nodes involved in cyclic transitions. In particular, we can prove all of the following formulas using natural number induction and the de nitions ccs(A) and ssims.
8P; Q (bisim(P; Q)) sim(P; Q)) bisim( x a:x; x (a:x + a:x)) 8P bisim(P; P) 8P bisim(P + 0; P) 8P bisim(P + P; P) 8P; Q; R (bisim(P; Q) bisim(P + R; Q + R)) 8 
Conclusion
It has been observed before and in this paper that linear logic can be used to specify transition systems. We have shown that if logic is extended with de nitions, then certain properties about elements of transition systems, namely simulation and bisimulation, can be captured naturally. Furthermore, if induction over integers is added, then we can increase the expressiveness of logic to establish more high-level facts about these properties, such as the fact that bisimulation is an equivalence.
From a high-level point-of-view, we can characterize the experiments we have reported here in two ways. From a (traditional) logic programming point of view, a de nition D is generally either a set of (positive) Horn clauses or an extension of them that allows negated atoms in the body of clauses. In that case, sequents in a proof of D`A, for atomic formula A, are either of the form ?! B or B ?!. In the rst case, def R is used to establish B and, in the second case, def L is used to build a nite refutation of B. In this paper, we consider richer de nitions so that the search for proofs must consider sequents of the form B ?! C; with such sequents, both left and right introduction of de nitions are used together. From a computational or concurrency point-of-view, proofs using just def R only capture the may behavior of a system: \there exists a computation such that : : :" is easily translated to \there exists a proof (in the sense of`) of : : :". The addition of the def L inference rule allows certain forms of must behavior to be captured.
